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Although researchers have demonstrated empirical relations 
among dispositional variables and prosocial behavior, a number 
of authors have tried to explicate the relatively modest magnitude 
and inconsistencies of these relations (e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Staub, 
1978). One possible explanation for the relatively modest relations 
is that a number of dispositional variables may be related to a giv-
en prosocial behavior and that these relations may be multiplicative 
in nature. That is, the probability of enactment of a specifi c proso-
cial behavior may be dependent on several dispositional character-
istics operating in conjunction. Some researchers (e.g., Staub, 1978) 
have suggested that the prediction of prosocial behaviors, as well as 
other behaviors, could be enhanced by the use of multiple disposi-
tional predictors. However, both the interactive relations of multiple 
dispositional predictors and the interaction of emerging developmen-
tal dispositions with more stable dispositional predictors have rarely 
been investigated. The present investigation was designed to exam-
ine the multiplicative relations of several dispositional variables to a 
prosocial behavior.
If a given prosocial behavior has multiple dispositional ante-
cedents that relate to behavior in a multiplicative manner, then the 
past research may have underestimated the magnitude of these re-
lations and the potential causal importance of personality by exam-
ining single predictor or simple additive models. More specifi cally, 
the absence of a subset of requisite dispositional qualities may sub-
stantially reduce the likelihood of a given prosocial behavior, and 
this reduction could be more than would be expected by a simple 
additive model.
Yet another possible explanation for the relatively modest rela-
tions just noted may have to do with the selection of the specifi c dispo-
sitional variables that have been related to specifi c prosocial behaviors. 
Different prosocial behaviors may have different sets of dispositional 
antecedents, and the selection of dispositional predictors may need to 
be based on a task analysis of the specifi c behavioral criterion. For ex-
ample, consistent with the suggestions of Snyder and Ickes (1985), the 
Person × Situation interaction may infl uence behavior by “pulling for” 
or creating situation-specifi c dispositional correlates. Thus, the situa-
tion in which the prosocial behavior occurs and specifi c features of the 
behavior may determine the specifi c dispositional variables that are re-
lated to a given prosocial behavior.
The dispositional variables assessed in this investigation were 
selected on the basis of a task analysis of the specifi c opportunity for 
prosocial behavior. Task analysis is a technique often used by cogni-
tive psychologists to identify and describe the cognitive and infor-
mation-processing demands of a specifi c behavioral task (see Chao, 
Knight, & Dubro, 1986, for an example). Because the present proso-
cial behavior consisted of the opportunity for children to donate mon-
ey to needy others who were in a situation that presented mixed and 
incongruent affective cues, the most relevant dispositional variables 
identifi ed in the task analysis were affective reasoning (or affective 
reconciliations, the tendency to understand and reconcile an ambigu-
ous affective context), sympathy (feelings of concern and sorrow for 
another), and money knowledge (understanding the units and value 
of specifi c denominations of money).
There is considerable evidence of individual differences in af-
fective reasoning (e.g., Carlo, Knight, Eisenberg, & Rotenberg, 
1991), sympathy (or empathic concern; see Davis, 1983), and mon-
ey knowledge (e.g., Berti & Bombi, 1981) among children. Further-
more, as theoretically expected, both affective reasoning and sympa-
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thy have been positively related to prosocial behavior (e.g., Carlo et 
al., 1991; Eisenberg, 1986; Underwood & Moore, 1982). However, 
consistent with the general literature relating dispositional variables 
to behavior, the relations of these variables to prosocial behaviors 
have been relatively modest. For example, in a meta-analytic study, 
Eisenberg and Miller (1987) found that questionnaire indices of dis-
positional sympathy or empathy accounted for approximately 3% of 
the variance in prosocial behavior. In addition, there is an emerg-
ing body of evidence of covariation between prosocial behavior and 
situation-demanded dispositional variables (e.g., Brady, Newcomb, 
& Hartup, 1983; Chao et al., 1986; Knight, Bohlmeyer, Stewart, & 
Harris, 1993).
In the present investigation it was expected that a child may do-
nate money to needy others in an affectively ambiguous situation if 
the child (a) tends to understand and reason about the affective plight 
of others, (b) is generally sympathetic when aware of another’s neg-
ative situation, and (c) understands the units and value of denomi-
nations of money. However, the absence of anyone or more of these 
characteristics may substantially reduce donating, and this reduction 
may be larger than would be expected on the basis of a simple additive 
model. That is, it was expected that although each of these disposition-
al variables may be separately related to donation, the multiplicative 
(i.e., moderational) predictors (particularly the three-way interaction) 
should account for a substantial proportion of the variance in donation 
above and beyond the main effect predictors.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 86 children (43 girls and 43 boys) between 6 
years, 0 months and 8 years, 11 months of age (M = 90.8 months, SD = 
11.0 months). The participating girls and boys were all children from a 
summer recreation camp who returned a signed parental consent form. 
These children were relatively evenly distributed across the age range.
Measures
Affective reasoning. The affective reasoning task (adapted from Ian-
notti, 1978) consisted of eight randomly ordered black-and-white pho-
tographs mounted on paper (sex of the child in the picture was matched 
with the sex of the participant) and corresponding stories. There were 
fi ve congruent stories (two sad and three happy) in which the facial ex-
pression and the situational cues in the story were consistent (e.g., a child 
smiling while looking at his or her birthday cake). In addition, there were 
three incongruent stories in which the facial expression and the situa-
tional cues were confl icting (e.g., a child holding a tray of cookies while 
frowning). The incongruent stimuli included two stories with a happy 
face in a sad situation and one with a sad face in a happy situation.
Children were asked to identify the affect of the character in each 
story by pointing to a face on a facial choice sheet (one sheet for each 
sex) that displayed line drawings of three randomly ordered sets of facial 
expressions. The three sets of facial expressions included a total of fi ve 
faces: a pair of happy–very happy faces, a pair of sad–very sad faces, and 
a neutral face. Before presenting the stories and after each story, the ex-
perimenter pointed to each of the faces on the facial choice sheet and la-
beled each one until it was clear the child understood the faces.
For each story, the picture depicting the events in the short story 
was covered with a sheet of paper as the experimenter read the story. 
The picture was revealed at a prompt (as designed by Iannotti, 1978) dur-
ing the middle of the story. The children were then asked to indicate how 
the character in the story felt and how they knew the protagonist felt that 
way. The children were required to indicate their choice of emotion on 
the facial choice sheet by pointing, even if they verbalized the emotions 
to the fi rst two questions.
The affective reasoning score (see Carlo et al., 1991) was the num-
ber of times the child’s responses to an incongruent picture story indicat-
ed any acknowledgment of, and compromise or rationalization of, the in-
congruent cues (e.g., “He’s sad because his mom didn’t make the kind of 
cookies he liked most” in response to the picture of the frowning child 
holding a tray of cookies). The coding of this relatively advanced affec-
tive reasoning was not appropriate from the congruent picture stories be-
cause the facial and situational cues were compatible and did not require 
reconciliation in these stories.1 Exact interrater agreement on 28% of the 
cases coded by two independent judges was 93% for affective reasoning. 
Scores on this affective reasoning measure were related to a prosocial be-
havior in previous research (Carlo et al., 1991).
Sympathy. The sympathy measure consisted of two of the three 
items used by Eisenberg, Fabes, Schaller, Carlo, and Miller (1991), 
which were adapted from the Davis (1983) Empathic Concern (sympa-
thy) Scale: “I often feel sorry for other children who are sad or in trou-
ble” and “When I see someone being picked on, I feel kind of sorry for 
them.”2 Children responded on a 5-point scale with anchors (marked by 
stacks of checkers of varying heights) ranging from not at all like me to 
always like me. Each item was scored from 1 (least sympathy) to 5 (most 
sympathy) and summed across the two items to form the sympathy index. 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability for this two-item scale was .60. Among chil-
dren in the same age range as the present sample, Eisenberg et al. (1991) 
found, as expected, that girls scored higher than boys on the three-item 
index of sympathy and that this index correlated with other dispositional 
(e.g., the Bryant Empathy Scale [1982]) and state indexes of sympathy or 
empathy (physiological reactions and self-reports).
Money knowledge. The knowledge about money measure consist-
ed of nine items selected from teacher workbooks designed for instruct-
ing children in this age range. Each question was accompanied by a picto-
rial display appropriate to the question being asked. For example, one item 
included a picture of a $1 bill and 10 quarters, and the child was asked to 
“color the coins to make one dollar.” The questions covered topics such as 
“Which of the two pictures has more money in it?” “How many quarters 
make a dollar?” “Can you buy this” object with the available money in the 
display, and “Which item costs more?” These items were designed to as-
sess children’s general facility with the units and values of various bills and 
coins (similar to Berti & Bombi, 1981). Each item on the knowledge of 
money scale was scored as 1 if correct and 0 if incorrect and was summed 
across items to create the money knowledge index. Cronbach’s alpha reli-
ability for this nine-item scale was .65.
Procedure
Children were individually escorted to a quiet room by a female ex-
perimenter. The experimenter was unaware of the scoring of the affective 
reasoning measure and was trained to follow a standardized script; there-
fore, the expected three-way interaction likely could not be produced 
1 An affective attribution score (i.e., number of correct affective labels in 
congruent picture stories) was not used in the analyses because of very little 
variability (i.e., over 99% were correct responses).
2 All three items used in Eisenberg et al. (1991) were administered. 
Eisenberg et al. reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .67. In the present study, 
Cronbach’s alpha for these items was .50 (vs. .60 for the two items). Therefore, 
the two-item scale was used. The fi ndings using the three-item scale were 
essentially identical to those reported.
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by experimenter bias. After completing the affective reasoning task, the 
money knowledge scale, and the sympathy scale (in a random order), 
each child was given $5 in increments of four $1 bills and four quarters 
as payment for participating in the study and asked to sign a receipt.
Children then watched a videotape (approximately 5 min long) of 
a girl about their age who has been burned. After a brief period of neu-
tral activity (e.g., coloring at a table in her bedroom) in the fi lm, there is 
an accident in which a girl is burned. The scene then shifts to the hospital 
where a concerned mother is seen talking to a friend on the phone; then, 
the girl is seen in bandages, walking using crutches, and recovering. The 
fi nal scene shows the girl at school being teased because of her burn 
scars. On the basis of the task analysis both congruent and confl icting 
affective cues similar to those in the affective reasoning measure were 
identifi ed in the video. For example, in the fi nal scene, as the girl is hav-
ing a pleasant and happy lunch (i.e., she is smiling) with a friend, she is 
teased about her scar by other children. Similar fi lms have been found to 
be emotionally evocative and to elicit sympathy in children (e.g., Eisen-
berg et al., 1991; Strayer & Schroeder, 1989).
After watching the video, children were told that the experimenter 
was a “member of a science club” that was “collecting money donations 
(for a local children’s hospital burn unit) for children who have been 
burned . . . like the one you saw in the fi lm.” Children were then asked to 
donate whatever amount of money they wished, including no money, to 
the burn unit. As they were told this, a donation box already containing 
some money (a fi xed and known amount) was pointed out to the subject. 
To allow children to donate apparently anonymously, the experimenter 
then left the room after saying that she forgot something that she needed 
to get. The donation measure was simply scored as the amount of money 
the child placed into the donation box.
During debriefi ng, the children were asked open-ended questions 
concerning whether anything in the fi lm had made them feel uncomfort-
able, whether they had seen this or a similar movie before, what they 
thought would be done with the donated money, whether they had talk-
ed about the study with their parents and what they had talked about, and 
whether they would be willing to avoid discussing the study with other 
children until the study was completed.3 Before leaving the experimen-
tal room the children were assured that the girl in the fi lm was doing very 
well now and was fully recovered, and they were allowed to select a toy 
to keep (in addition to the money they had been given). No children were 
visibly upset at the time the session was over, and all agreed not to dis-
cuss the study with other children.
Results
Preliminary analyses revealed no signifi cant main effects or in-
teractions involving sex for any of the dispositional predictors or do-
nation; therefore, sex was not included as a factor in the reported 
analyses. Preliminary analyses also indicated that the three disposi-
tional predictors were not signifi cantly intercorrelated (ranging from 
r = –.16 to .02). The means and standard deviations were as follows: 
affective reasoning M = 0.81 and SD = 1.06; sympathy M = 7.83 and 
SD = 2.34; money knowledge M = 6.44 and SD = 2.93; and dona-
tion M = 0.30 and SD = 0.52.
To assess the multiplicative relations of the dispositional vari-
ables to donation, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was per-
formed using donation as the criterion and the dispositional variables 
and all possible interactions as predictors.4 The scores on the predic-
tors were centered before these analyses to eliminate the nonessen-
tial collinearity produced by the calculation of product terms (Aiken 
& West, 1991). In this hierarchical multiple regression analysis the 
three main effect vectors (affective reasoning, sympathy, and money 
knowledge) were entered on the fi rst step, the three two-way interac-
tion vectors were entered on the second step, and the three-way inter-
action vector was entered on the third step. 
Table 1 presents the squared multiple correlation and the stan-
dardized partial regression coeffi cients for each step of the hierar-
chical multiple regression analysis. At the fi rst step, the main effects 
accounted for 10% of the variance in donation, F(3, 82) = 2.98, p 
< .05, with sympathy and money knowledge producing signifi cant 
standardized partial regression coeffi cients. At the second step, the 
main effects and two-way interactions accounted for 19% of the vari-
ance in donation, F(6, 79) = 3.04, .p < .01, with money knowledge 
and the Affective Reasoning × Money Knowledge interaction pro-
ducing signifi cant standardized partial regression coeffi cients. Fur-
thermore, the inclusion of the two-way interactions resulted in an 
additional 9% explained variance in donation, F(3, 79) = 2.89, p < 
.05. At the third step, the main effects, two-way interactions, and the 
three-way interaction accounted for 26% of the variance in donation, 
Table 1
Results of the Hierarchical Multiple                                       
Regression Analysis at Each Step 
   Variable entered                   Multiple R2     Standardized β
Step 1  0.10
 Affective reasoning   .08
 Sympathy   .23*
 Money knowledge   .22*
Step 2  0.19
 Affective reasoning (A)   .03
 Sympathy (B)   .16
 Money knowledge (C)   .21*
 A × B   .11
 A × C   .27*
 B × C   .20
Step 3  0.26
 Affective reasoning (A)   –.03   (–.03)
 Sympathy (B)   .26*  (.25*)
 Money knowledge (C)   .27**  (.15)
 A × B   .15  (.15)
 A × C   .33**  (.37**)
 B × C   .15  (.14)
 A × B × C   .33**  (.37**)
Note. The coeffi cients in parentheses are for an analysis that also 
includes months of age as a predictor.
*ps ≤ .05. **p<.01.
3 During debriefi ng, 5 children reported talking with their parents about 
donating to worthy causes. All children indicated a belief that the donations 
would go to the hospital burn unit and, with one exception, that they were 
free to decide how much to donate. One child was told by a parent to bring 
the money home. Analyses excluding these six cases produced essentially 
identical fi ndings.
4 Analyses using the reciprocal transformation of the donation and 
affective reasoning scores to correct for the skew in these distributions 
produced essentially identical fi ndings. Furthermore, analyses of the residuals 
in the reported analyses revealed no unusually infl uential or out-lier cases.
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F(7, 78) = 3.87, p < .0 I, with sympathy, money knowledge, the Af-
fective Reasoning × Money Knowledge interaction, and the three-
way interaction producing signifi cant standardized partial regression 
coeffi cients. Moreover, as predicted, the inclusion of the three-way 
interaction resulted in an additional 7% explained variance in dona-
tion over and above the main effects and two-way interactions, F(I, 
78) = 7.35, p < .01.
Figure 1 presents a graphic display of the signifi cant three-
way interaction using the procedures for examining interactions 
among continuous predictors as described by Aiken and West (1991). 
These procedures involve calculating simple regression lines at ex-
emplar high and low values corresponding with one standard devia-
tion above and below the mean for each predictor. Thus, the specif-
ic simple regression lines depicted in Figure 1 represent the nature of 
the three-way interaction at specifi c levels of the predictors. (A fully 
complete view of this interaction can only be represented by a three-
dimensional plane.) Tests of simple slopes for these four lines indi-
cated that only the slope for the high affective reasoning-high sympa-
thy regression line was signifi cantly different from zero, t(78) = 4.97, 
p < .001. That is, increases in money knowledge led to increases in 
donation only when the child was also high in affective reasoning 
and sympathy. Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 1, those chil-
dren who scored high in affective reasoning, sympathy, and knowl-
edge about money donated considerably more than those who scored 
low on anyone or more of the dispositional variables.
Analyses also indicated that older children, relative to younger chil-
dren, donated more money (r = .23, p < .05) and scored higher in money 
knowledge (r = .49, p < .001). However, age was not signifi cantly related 
to affective reasoning (r = –.08) or sympathy (r = .04).
Table 1 also presents (in parentheses) the standardized partial 
regression coeffi cients for each of the dispositional predictors and in-
teractions when months of age was also included as a main effect 
predictor. The only notable infl uence of the inclusion of age as a pre-
dictor was the substantial reduction of the standardized partial re-
gression coeffi cient for the money knowledge main effect.
If the age differences in donation were due to age differences 
in money knowledge, then the simultaneous entry of age and money 
knowledge into a multiple regression analysis predicting donations 
should produce an overall signifi cant proportion of explained vari-
ance but nonsignifi cant standardized partial regression coeffi cients. 
This is because the standardized partial regression coeffi cients indi-
cate the infl uence of the respective predictor after removing variance 
(i.e., statistically controlling) from the criterion variable associated 
with the other predictors included in the regression equation. This 
analysis revealed a signifi cant overall regression equation, F(2, 83) 
= 3.23, p < .05, and explained 7% of the variance in donations. How-
ever, the standardized partial regression coeffi cients for age (.15) and 
for money knowledge (.16) were both nonsignifi cant. Thus, the age 
differences in money knowledge accounted for the age differences 
in donations.
Discussion
As expected, the individual differences in donation behavior 
were a function of individual differences in the dispositional vari-
ables. Affective reasoning, sympathy, money knowledge, and the 
multiplicative relations of these variables accounted for 26% of 
the variance in donations. In addition, the utilization of a multi-
plicative dispositional model accounted for a substantially larg-
er proportion (i.e., 2.6 times as much) of the variance in dona-
tions than a simple additive model including only main effects. 
Furthermore, the age differences in donations may be a function 
of age differences in money knowledge. Overall, the present fi nd-
ings help provide a more thorough understanding of individu-
al and developmental differences in prosocial behavior and have 
several important implications.
The present fi ndings demonstrate the possibility that a giv-
en prosocial behavior may have multiple dispositional antecedents 
that function interactively to produce behavior. As expected, chil-
dren who scored high in affective reasoning, sympathy, and mon-
ey knowledge donated the most, and scoring low on any subset of 
these dispositional predictors resulted in a larger reduction in dona-
tions than would be expected by a simple additive model. Consid-
er, for example, a comparison of two hypothetical children: Child 
A, who scores high (i.e., one standard deviation above the mean) 
in affective reasoning, sympathy, and money knowledge, and Child 
B, who scores high in affective reasoning and money knowledge 
but low (i.e., one standard deviation below the mean) in sympa-
thy. A simple additive model based on a regression equation in 
which only main effect predictors were entered would lead to pre-
dicted donations of $0.56 (11.2% of the available $5) for Child A 
and $0.34 (6.8%) for Child B. In contrast, the multiplicative model 
would lead to predicted donations of $1.01 (20.2% of the available 
$5) for Child A and $0.18 (3.6%) for Child B. Thus, in the present 
study, scoring low on only sympathy would lead to an expected re-
duction in donation of $0.22 (a 4.4% difference) in the simple addi-
tive model versus $0.87 (a 17.4% difference) in the multiplicative 
dispositional model.
By not examining the multiplicative infl uences of disposition-
al antecedents, previous research may have underestimated the mag-
nitude, and importance, of dispositional infl uences on prosocial behav-
ior. In the present study, a simple additive model accounted for only 
Figure 1. The three-way interaction involving low (Panel a) and high (Panel 
b) affective reasoning, sympathy, and money knowledge predicting the 
amount of money donated using the Aiken and West (1991) procedures for di
splaying interactions among continuous variables (MK = money knowledge).
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10% of the variance in donations, whereas the multiplicative disposi-
tional model accounted for 26% of the variance. In addition, the sim-
ple additive model, or single predictor model, would have incorrectly 
led to the conclusion that affective reasoning was not an important dis-
positional variable in explaining variance in donations. It is also like-
ly that the examination of multiplicative dispositional models may en-
hance the explanation of variance in behaviors other than prosocial 
behaviors. Although a number of researchers have considered Person 
× Situation interactions in an attempt to explain a greater proportion 
of the variance in a wide range of behaviors (e.g., Bem & Allen, 1974; 
Bem & Funder, 1978; Funder & Colvin, 1991; Kenrick & Funder 
1988; Magnusson & Endler, 1977; Zuckerman, Bernieri, Koestner, & 
Rosenthal, 1989), there has been relatively little consideration of the 
multiplicative infl uence of dispositional variables.
Another implication of the present fi ndings is that it may take a 
conglomerate of dispositional variables to stimulate a given prosocial 
behavior. Although it may not be clear how and whether such a con-
glomerate differs from a global personality variable as described by 
Funder (1991), a conglomerate is quite different from an aggregate 
of dispositional variables. A conglomerate of dispositional variables 
is a mixture of specifi c dispositional variables existing together while 
maintaining their unique qualities. When variables are aggregat-
ed they are simply summed together without regard for their unique 
qualities. If indeed, a given prosocial behavior has multiple disposi-
tional antecedents that are causally related to that prosocial behavior 
in a multiplicative manner, then aggregating the multiple disposition-
al antecedents would underestimate the causal infl uence of the dispo-
sitional antecedents.
The present fi ndings are also consistent with the suggestion that 
there may be situation-specifi c dispositional antecedents of specifi c 
prosocial behaviors. The dispositional predictors used in this study 
were selected on the basis of a task analysis of the specifi c proso-
cial behavior opportunity. A prosocial behavior different from that 
investigated in this study may have, and pull for (cf. Snyder & Ickes, 
1985), a different set of dispositional antecedents. For example, Car-
lo et al. (1991) demonstrated that affective reasoning was related to 
helping in a situation that contained incongruent affective cues, but 
not related to helping in a situation that contained only congruent 
cues. Furthermore, if different prosocial behaviors have different dis-
positional antecedents, then aggregating prosocial behaviors would 
also underestimate the magnitude, and importance, of dispositional 
infl uences.
Finally, these fi ndings also have implications for researchers’ 
understanding of prosocial development. Developmental changes in 
the task-relevant dispositional antecedents could explain the devel-
opmental changes in a specifi c prosocial behavior. Furthermore, de-
velopmental changes in situation-specifi c dispositional antecedents 
could explain the variability in the pattern of age differences across 
prosocial behaviors (Eisenberg, 1986). For example, there are sub-
stantial developmental changes in cooperative resource allocations 
around 5 years of age (Chao et al., 1986), monetary donations in the 
6-8-year age range (this investigation), sharing an object in a fi xed 
time interval around 8 years of age (Knight et al., 1993), and pro-
portional equity resource distributions in early adolescence (Hook & 
Cook, 1979). The occurrence of these prosocial behaviors at quite 
different ages may, in part, be due to individual differences in the ac-
quisition of the task-relevant dispositional qualities (i.e., mathemat-
ical operations skills, knowledge of the units and values of money, 
temporal monitoring abilities, and proportional thought abilities, re-
spectively). Although the relations among these specifi c sociocogni-
tive dispositional qualities and prosocial behaviors could be the spu-
rious result of general achievement or intelligence differences, this 
seems unlikely given the discriminant relations noted earlier (Carlo 
et al., 1991) and given the low positive correlations between intelli-
gence and prosocial behavior that are very often nonsignifi cant (see 
Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989; Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chap-
man, 1983).
References
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and inter-
preting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Bem, D. J., & Allen, A. (1974). On predicting some of the people some of the 
time: The search for cross-situational consistencies in behavior. Psycho-
logical Review, 81, 506–520.
Bem, D. J., & Funder, D. C. (1978). Predicting more of the people more
of the time: Assessing the personality of situations. Psychological Review, 85, 
485–501.
Berti, A. E., & Bombi, A. S. (1981). The development of the concept of mon-
ey and its value: A longitudinal study. Child Development, 52, 1179–
1182.
Brady, J. E., Newcomb, A. F., & Hartup, W. W. (1983). Context and com-
panion’s behavior as determinants of cooperation and competition in 
school-age children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 36, 
396–412.
Bryant, B. K. (1982). An index of empathy for children and adolescents. 
Child Development, 53, 413–425.
Carlo, G., Knight, G. P., Eisenberg, N., & Rotenberg, K. J. (1991). Cogni-
tive processes and prosocial behaviors among children: The role of cog-
nitive attributions and reconciliations. Developmental Psychology, 27, 
456–461.
Chao, C.-C., Knight, G. P., & Dubro, A. F. (1986). Information processing 
and age differences in social decision-making. Developmental Psychol-
ogy, 22, 500–508.
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence 
for a multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 44, 113–126.
Eisenberg, N. (1986). Altruistic emotion. cognition and behavior. Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum.
Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., Schaller, M., Carlo, G., & Miller, P. A. (1991). 
The relations of parental characteristics and practices to children’s vi-
carious emotional responding. Child Development, 62, 1393–1408.
Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. A. (1987). The relation of empathy to prosocial 
and related behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 91–119.
Eisenberg, N., & Mussen, P. H. (1989). The roots of prosocial behavior in 
children. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Funder, D. C. (1991). Global traits: A neo-Allportian approach to personality. 
Psychological Science, 2, 31–39.
Funder, D. C., & Colvin, R. (1991). Explorations in behavioral consistency: 
Properties of persons, situations, and behaviors. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 60, 773–794.
DISPOSITIONAL ANTECEDENTS OF A PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR                                                       183 
Hook, J. G., & Cook, T. D. (1979). Equity theory and the cognitive ability of 
children. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 429–445.
Iannotti, R. J. (1978). Effect of role-taking experiences on role-taking, empa-
thy, altruism, and aggression. Developmental Psychology, 14, 119–124.
Kenrick, D. T., & Funder, D. C. (1988). Profi ting from controversy: Lessons 
from the person-situation debate. American Psychologist, 43, 23–34.
Knight, G. P., Bohlmeyer, E. M., Stewart, H. S., & Harris, J. D. (1993). Age 
differences in temporal monitoring and equal sharing in a fi xed-duration 
sharing task. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 11, 143–
158.
Magnusson, D., & Endler, N. S. (Eds.). (1977). Personality at the crossroads: 
Current issues in interactional psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Radke-Yarrow, M., Zahn-Waxler, C., & Chapman, M. (1983). Prosocial dis-
positions and behavior. In P. Mussen (Series Ed.) & E. M. Hetherington 
(Vol. Ed.), Manual of child psychology: Vol. 4. Socialization, personali-
ty, and social development (pp. 469–545). New York: Wiley.
Snyder, M., & Ickes, W. (1985). Personality and social behavior. In G. Lin-
dzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (3rd ed., pp. 
883–948). New York: Random House.
Staub, E. (1978). Positive social behavior and morality: Social and personal 
infl uences. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Strayer, J., & Schroeder, M. (1989). Children’s helping strategies: Infl uences 
of emotion, empathy, and age. In N. Eisenberg (Ed.), New directions for 
child development: Empathy and related emotional responses (pp. 85–
105). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Underwood, B., & Moore, B. (1982). Perspective-taking and altruism. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 91, 143–173.
Zuckerman, M., Bernieri, F., Koestner, R., & Rosenthal, R. (1989). To predict 
some of the people some of the time: In search of moderators. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 279–293.
Submitted January 1993; revised April 1993; accepted June 1993.
